广西壮族自治区矿产资源管理条例（2004年修正）
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广西壮族自治区矿产资源管理条例（2004年修正）
广西壮族自治区人大常委会
广西壮族自治区人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改《广西壮族自治区矿产资源管理条例》的决定
（2004年6月3日广西壮族自治区第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第八次会议通过 2004年6月3日广西壮族自治区人民代表大会常务委员会公告十届第31号公布 自2004年7月1日起施行）
广西壮族自治区第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第八次会议决定对《广西壮族自治区矿产资源管理条例》作如下修改：
一、删去第十一条第一款中的“确认”。
删去该条第二款。
删去该条第三款中的“具体管理和使用办法，由地质矿产主管部门会同财政部门、计划主管部门制定”。
二、删去第二十三条第一款第六项。
删去该条第二款中的“法规、规章”。
删去该条第三款中的“具体办法由自治区地质矿产主管部门规定”。
三、第二十五条修改为：“地方人民政府财政出资勘查形成的采矿权价款，由依法取得评估资格的评估机构进行评估，评估结果由自治区地质矿产主管部门确认。”
四、删去第三十二条第一款。
五、删去第三十三条。
六、删去第三十四条。
七、第三十九条改为第三十七条，第四项修改为：“查封、扣留违法开采的矿产品。”
八、第四十六条改为第四十四条，删去第一款。
九、删去第四十七条。
此外，还作了一些文字修改，并根据本决定对条文顺序作相应调整。
本决定自2004年7月1日起施行。
《广西壮族自治区矿产资源管理条例》根据本决定作相应修改，重新公布。
附：广西壮族自治区矿产资源管理条例（2004年修正本）
（2000年12月2日广西壮族自治区第九届人民代表大会常务委员会第二十一次会议通过 根据2004年6月3日广西壮族自治区第十届人民代表大会常务委员会第八次会议《关于修改〈广西壮族自治区矿产资源管理条例〉的决定》修正）
第一章 总则
第二章 矿产资源勘查
第三章 矿产资源开采
第四章 探矿权采矿权的转让
第五章 监督管理
第六章 法律责任
第七章 附则
第一章 总则
第一条 为了加强矿产资源的勘查、开发利用和保护工作，维护探矿权人、采矿权人的合法权益和矿业秩序，促进矿业可持续发展，保护地质环境，根据《中华人民共和国矿产资源法》和有关法律、行政法规，结合本自治区实际，制定本条例。
第二条 在自治区行政区域内从事矿产资源勘查、开采和管理的单位和个人，必须遵守本条例。
第三条 矿产资源勘查、开采坚持开发利用与保护并重的原则。
第四条 鼓励国内外投资者依法在自治区行政区域内合资、合作或者独资勘查、开采矿产资源。保障投资者的合法权益不受侵犯。
第五条 勘查、开采矿产资源，必须依法取得探矿权、采矿权。
探矿权、采矿权实行有偿取得制度。依法取得的探矿权、采矿权可以按照有关法律、行政法规和本条例的规定转让。
第六条 勘查、开采矿产资源，应当节约用地，保护环境，防治地质灾害，防止水土流失，做好植被恢复和土地复垦工作。
第七条 各级人民政府应当采取措施，加强矿产资源的保护，依法维护本行政区域内的矿业秩序，保护探矿权、采矿权不受侵犯，保障勘查作业区和矿区的正常生产秩序和工作秩序。
第八条 县级以上地质矿产主管部门负责本行政区域内矿产资源勘查、开采的监督管理工作，有关主管部门协助同级地质矿产主管部门做好矿产资源勘查、开采的监督管理工作。
第二章 矿产资源勘查
第九条 矿产资源勘查实行统一的区块登记管理制度。勘查下列矿产资源，由自治区地质矿产主管部门审批登记，颁发勘查许可证：
（一）国务院《矿产资源勘查区块登记管理办法》第四条第一款、第二款规定以外的矿产资源；
（二）国务院地质矿产主管部门授权省级地质矿产主管部门审批登记的矿产资源。
第十条 勘查出资人为探矿权申请人。国家出资勘查的，国家委托勘查的单位为探矿权申请人。
地方人民政府财政（包括使用地方留成的矿产资源补偿费，下同）出资勘查或者合作勘查的，合同约定的单位为探矿权申请人。
第十一条 申请地方人民政府财政出资勘查并已经探明矿产地的区块的探矿权的，探矿权申请人除依法缴纳探矿权使用费外，还应当缴纳经评估的探矿权价款。
探矿权使用费和地方人民政府财政出资勘查形成的探矿权价款，由登记管理机关收取，全部纳入同级财政预算管理。
第十二条 勘查许可证的申报、审批、核发和变更、注销登记，依照国务院《矿产资源勘查区块登记管理办法》办理。
第十三条 从事地质勘查活动的单位，必须依法取得地质勘查资格。
探矿权人不具有地质勘查资格的，应当委托具有地质勘查资格的单位进行地质勘查。
第十四条 探矿权人需要延长勘查工作时间的，应当在勘查许可证法定有效期届满的30日前申请延续登记。可申请延续登记2次，每次延续时间不得超过2年。
探矿权人逾期不办理延续登记手续的，勘查许可证自行废止。
第十五条 探矿权人应当按照勘查许可证规定的勘查区块范围和勘查项目进行勘查，并按照批准的勘查设计施工，不得越界勘查，不得擅自进行采矿活动。
第十六条 探矿权人完成勘查项目后，必须编写勘查报告。供矿山建设使用的一般大型、中型、小型矿床勘查报告和供中型、小型水源地建设使用的地下水勘查报告，由自治区矿产储量审批机构审批。
矿产储量审批机构应当自收到大中型勘查报告之日起6个月内，小型勘查报告之日起3个月内作出批复。
未经审批的勘查报告不得作为矿山建设设计的依据。
第十七条 探矿权人应当按照国务院有关规定向自治区地质矿产主管部门汇交勘查报告和其他有价值的勘查资料，填报矿产储量登记统计资料。
矿床勘查报告和其他有价值的勘查资料按国务院规定实行有偿使用。
第三章 矿产资源开采
第十八条 开采矿产资源，应当向县级以上地质矿产主管部门办理采矿登记手续，取得采矿许可证。但是，开采矿产资源属于下列情形之一的，不需要办理采矿登记手续、领取采矿许可证：
（一）建设单位在工程建设项目批准占地范围内，因工程需要动用或者采挖只能用作普通建筑材料的砂、石、粘土并用于本工程建设的；
（二）不以营利为目的，采挖只能用作普通建筑材料的砂、石、粘土并用于公益性建设的；
（三）个人为生活自用在规定范围内采挖只能用作普通建筑材料的砂、石、粘土的；
（四）采挖用于抢险救灾的砂、石、粘土的。
第十九条 开采矿产资源，必须统筹规划，优先保证国家和自治区经济发展的需要。除国家规划矿区外，对自治区经济发展具有重要价值的矿区，由自治区地质矿产主管部门会同有关部门提出划定自治区规划矿区方案，并提请自治区人民政府批准，由所在地县级人民政府予以公告。
第二十条 开采下列矿产资源，由自治区地质矿产主管部门审批登记，颁发采矿许可证：
（一）国务院《矿产资源开采登记管理办法》第三条第一款、第二款规定以外的矿产储量规模中型以上的矿产资源；
（二）自治区规划矿区内的矿产资源；
（三）自治区财政出资勘查探明矿产地的矿产资源；
（四）国务院地质矿产主管部门授权省级地质矿产主管部门审批登记的矿产资源；
（五）依法可以边探边采的矿产资源。
开采本条第一款规定以外的矿产储量规模为小型的矿产资源，由设区的市地质矿产主管部门审批登记，颁发采矿许可证。
开采本条第一款、第二款规定以外的矿产储量规模为小矿、零星分散矿产资源和只能用作普通建筑材料的砂、石、粘土，由县级地质矿产主管部门审批登记，颁发采矿许可证。
矿区范围跨县级以上行政区域的，由所涉及行政区域的共同上一级地质矿产主管部门审批登记，颁发采矿许可证。
第二十一条 矿产储量规模的小型、小矿和零星分散矿产资源的划分标准，由自治区矿产储量审批机构规定。
矿山建设规模应当与矿产储量规模相适应。
第二十二条 采矿权申请人在提出采矿权申请前，应当持经批准的勘查报告或者地质资料，按照本条例第二十条规定的权限向地质矿产主管部门申请划定矿区范围。
地质矿产主管部门在划定矿区范围时，认为申请的矿区范围需要实测的，采矿权申请人应当聘请具有测绘资格的单位实地勘测。
需要申请立项，设立矿山企业的，应当根据划定的矿区范围，按照国家有关规定办理有关手续。
第二十三条 采矿权申请人申请办理采矿许可证时，应当向地质矿产主管部门提交下列资料：
（一）采矿权申请登记书和矿区范围图；
（二）采矿权申请人资质条件的证明；
（三）矿产资源开发利用方案；
（四）依法设立矿山企业或者个体采矿的批准文件；
（五）开采矿产资源的环境影响评价报告和安全生产保障措施报告。
法律规定需要有关主管部门提出审批意见的，采矿权申请人应当提交有关批准文件。
开采小矿、零星分散矿产资源和只能用作普通建筑材料的砂、石、粘土的，申请办理采矿许可证的手续可以从简。
第二十四条 地质矿产主管部门应当自收到申请之日起40日内，作出准予登记或者不予登记的决定，并书面通知采矿权申请人。需要采矿权申请人修改或者补充本条例第二十三条规定的资料的，地质矿产主管部门应当通知采矿权申请人限期修改或者补充；申请时间从修改或者补充资料齐全之日起计算。
准予登记的，采矿权申请人应当自收到通知之日起30日内，依法缴纳采矿权使用费和地方人民政府财政出资勘查形成的采矿权价款，办理登记手续，领取采矿许可证，成为采矿权人。逾期不办理的，视为放弃申请。
不予登记的，地质矿产主管部门应当向采矿权申请人说明理由。
第二十五条 地方人民政府财政出资勘查形成的采矿权价款，由依法取得评估资格的评估机构进行评估，评估结果由自治区地质矿产主管部门确认。
第二十六条 地质矿产主管部门在颁发采矿许可证后，应当通知矿区范围所在地的有关县级人民政府。有关县级人民政府应当自收到通知之日起90日内，对矿区范围予以公告，并可根据采矿权人的申请，组织埋设界桩或者设置地面标志。
采矿权人应当在采矿窿（井）口或者采场张挂由自治区地质矿产主管部门统一制作的采矿权标志牌。
第二十七条 采矿许可证有效期，按照矿山建设规模确定：大型以上的，采矿许可证有效期最长为30年；中型的，采矿许可证有效期最长为20年；小型的，采矿许可证有效期最长为10年；开采小矿、零星分散矿产资源和只能用作普通建筑材料的砂、石、粘土的，采矿许可证有效期最长为3年。采矿许可证有效期满，需要继续采矿的，采矿权人应当在采矿许可证有效期届满的30日前，到原发证机关办理延续登记手续。发证机关应在接到报告之日起15日内审批完毕。
采矿权人逾期不办理延续登记手续的，采矿许可证自行废止。
第二十八条 在采矿许可证有效期内，有下列情形之一的，采矿权人应当在变更前向地质矿产主管部门申请办理变更登记：
（一）变更矿区范围的；
（二）变更主要开采矿种的；
（三）变更开采方式的；
（四）变更矿山企业名称的；
（五）经依法批准转让采矿权的。
变更矿山企业法定代表人的，应当在变更之日起15日内向所在地地质矿产主管部门备案。
第二十九条 采矿权人在采矿许可证有效期内或者有效期届满，停办、关闭矿山的，应当自决定停办或者关闭矿山之日起30日内，向原发证机关申请办理采矿许可证注销登记手续。发证机关应在接到报告之日起15日内审批完毕。
第三十条 采矿权人自采矿许可证颁发之日起，有下列情形之一的，采矿许可证颁发机关有权注销其采矿许可证：
（一）开采大中型规模矿产资源，在2年内逾期未进行建设或者生产的，无正当理由停工或者停产连续满2年的；
（二）开采小型规模、小矿、零星分散矿产资源和只能用作普通建筑材料的砂、石、粘土，在1年内逾期未进行建设或者生产的，无正当理由停工或者停产连续满1年的。
第三十一条 开采矿产资源，必须按照有关主管部门批准、地质矿产主管部门认可的矿产资源开发利用方案施工，不得随意丢弃矿产资源。
禁止采取破坏性开采方法开采矿产资源。
第三十二条 收购矿山企业和个体采矿者出售的矿产品，收购单位和个人应当要求出售者出示采矿许可证；无采矿许可证的，收购单位和个人不得收购。
国务院和自治区人民政府规定由指定的单位统一收购的矿产品，任何其他单位和个人不得收购。开采者不得向非指定单位销售。
第四章 探矿权采矿权的转让
第三十三条 探矿权人在完成规定的最低勘查投入后，经依法批准，可以将探矿权转让他人。
已经取得采矿权的矿山企业，因企业合并、分立，与他人合资、合作经营，或者因企业资产出售以及有其他变更企业资产产权的情形，需要变更采矿权主体的，经依法批准，可以将采矿权转让他人采矿。
第三十四条 转让地方人民政府财政出资勘查所形成的探矿权、采矿权的，必须进行评估，缴纳经评估的探矿权价款、采矿权价款。
第三十五条 转让探矿权、采矿权，必须依照国务院《探矿权采矿权转让管理办法》规定的条件和程序办理。
第五章 监督管理
第三十六条 地质矿产主管部门应当对探矿权人的勘查投入、勘查工作进展情况，采矿权人合理开发利用矿产资源、保护环境和依法缴纳矿产资源税费以及其他执行矿产资源法律、法规的情况进行监督检查，探矿权人、采矿权人和其他有关人员应当如实报告有关情况并提供有关资料，不得虚报、瞒报，不得拒绝检查。
对探矿权人、采矿权人要求保密的申请登记资料、财务决算报表和勘查成果资料等，地质矿产主管部门应当予以保密。
第三十七条 地质矿产主管部门对违反矿产资源法律、法规的行为进行检查时，有权采取下列措施：
（一）按照规定程序询问违法的行为人、利害关系人、证明人，制作询问笔录，并要求提供证明材料；
（二）进入违法勘查、开采的现场进行勘测；
（三）查阅、复制与违法行为有关的合同、发票、帐单及其他资料；
（四）查封、扣留违法开采的矿产品。
第三十八条 地质矿产主管部门在采取查封、扣留措施时，必须出具查封、扣留凭证，造具清单，由在场人签名或者盖章后，交被查封、扣留者一份。
地质矿产主管部门对查封、扣留的矿产品应当妥善保管，不得动用、调换或者损毁。
地质矿产主管部门应当从查封、扣留矿产品之日起3个月内，对违反矿产资源法律、法规的行为依法作出处理决定。逾期不作出处理决定的，地质矿产主管部门应当解除查封、扣留。
第三十九条 勘查、开采矿产资源，应当妥善处理生产中的废水、废渣和废矿，对有害物质应当进行无害化处理，防止环境污染、地质环境破坏、资源破坏或者引发地质灾害。
第四十条 对违反矿产资源法律、法规的行为，依法应当给予行政处罚，而有关地质矿产主管部门不给予行政处罚的，上级地质矿产主管部门有权责令有关地质矿产主管部门作出行政处罚决定或者直接给予行政处罚。
第六章 法律责任
第四十一条 违反本条例第十八条规定，未取得采矿许可证，擅自开采矿产资源的，由地质矿产主管部门责令停止开采、赔偿损失，没收采出的矿产品和违法所得，可以并处二千元以上十万元以下的罚款；对违法开采矿产资源的采矿设备，责令限期拆除，逾期不拆除的，依法强制拆除；拒不停止开采，造成矿产资源严重破坏，构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第四十二条 买卖、出租或者以其他任何形式转让矿产资源的，由地质矿产主管部门责令停止违法行为，没收违法所得，处以一万元以上十万元以下的罚款。
第四十三条 不按照批准的勘查设计或者矿产资源开发利用方案施工的，由地质矿产主管部门责令限期改正；逾期不改正的，处一千元以上五万元以下的罚款；情节严重的，原发证机关可以吊销勘查许可证或者采矿许可证。
第四十四条 擅自收购无采矿许可证开采的矿产品，擅自收购和销售国务院、自治区人民政府规定由指定的单位统一收购的矿产品的，由工商行政管理部门没收矿产品和违法所得，可以并处违法所得一倍以下的罚款。
第四十五条 勘查、开采矿产资源，造成环境污染、地质环境破坏、资源破坏或者引发地质灾害，未按规定恢复治理的，责令限期恢复治理；情节严重的，吊销勘查许可证、采矿许可证；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第四十六条 探矿权人、采矿权人和其他有关人员不按照本条例第三十六条规定如实报告有关情况、提供有关资料或者拒绝接受监督检查的，由地质矿产主管部门责令限期改正；逾期不改正的，予以警告，可以并处一千元以上五万元以下的罚款。
第四十七条 国家法律、行政法规另有处罚规定的，从其规定。
第四十八条 地质矿产主管部门工作人员玩忽职守、滥用职权或者徇私舞弊的，由其所在单位或者有关机关依法给予行政处分；构成犯罪的，依法追究刑事责任。
第七章 附则
第四十九条 本条例自2001年1月1日起施行。
国务院办公厅转发国务院机构改革办公室对国家环境保护局、国家海洋局有关海洋环境保护职责分工意见的通知
国务院办公厅
国务院办公厅转发国务院机构改革办公室对国家环境保护局、国家海洋局有关海洋环境保护职责分工意见的通知
国务院办公厅
国务院机构改革办公室《对国家环境保护局、国家海洋局有关海洋环境保护职责分工的意见》已经国务院同意，现转发给你们，请按此执行。
对国家环境保护局、国家海洋局有关海洋环境保护职责分工的意见
海洋环境保护工作既是全国环境保护工作的一个组成部分，又是海洋综合管理的一项重要内容。国家海洋局要支持、协同国家环保局对全国环境保护工作实施统一监督管理。国家环保局要支持国家海洋局对我国管辖海洋实施综合管理。
一、关于海洋环境标准的制定
国家海洋环境质量标准和污染物排放标准可由国家环保局委托国家海洋局会同有关部门组织草拟，由国家环保局审查批准。
二、关于海洋特别保护区、海洋自然保护区和海洋功能区的划定和管理
海洋特别保护区的选划工作，迄今尚未进行。对这类保护区的内涵和保护对象，以及选划程序和管理的分工，由国家海洋局组织研究，提出方案，报国务院审批。
海洋自然保护区是自然保护区的一种类型。已建的国家级海洋或与海洋资源、环境有关的自然保护区，其管理体制、隶属关系不变，原主管部门应同国家海洋局密切配合，把保护区建设和管理好。新建国家级海洋自然保护区，由国家海洋局或国务院有关主管部门会同国家海洋局提出选
区的建议，按规定程序报国务院批准后，由该保护区主管部门负责建设和管理。如有意见分歧，由国家环保局进行协调。
划分海洋功能区是海洋开发规划和海洋综合管理的一项基础性工作，其内容兼及海洋资源开发利用和海洋环境保护，其范围全面覆盖我国管辖海域。此项工作由国家海洋局会同沿海省、自治区、直辖市和有关部门进行。沿海省、自治区、直辖市环保部门在近海海域进行的环境功能区划
工作，应纳入海洋功能区划系列，互相衔接和协调，同时要避免与经批准的有关的全国性功能区划相矛盾。对此，国家海洋局和国家环保局要共同商定联系的办法。两局之间如有意见分歧，请国家计委协调。
三、关于海洋环境监测工作的组织管理
国家海洋局负责组织的“全国海洋污染监测网”，是国家环保局负责筹建的全国环境监测网的组成部分，是它的一个分网。前者应按规定向后者提供海洋污染监测资料。沿海省、自治区、直辖市环保部门也应按分工向全国海洋污染监测网提供陆地污染源资料。
1990年8月1日
Chapter IV
Function of Panels: Art. 11 of the DSU
OUTLINE
I Introduction
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
IV Allegation against Panels’ Standard of Review
V Exercise of Judicial Economy
I Introduction
The function of panels is expressly defined in Art. 11 of the DSU, which reads as follows:
“The function of panels is to assist the DSB in discharging its responsibilities under this Understanding and the covered agreements. Accordingly, a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements, and make such other findings as will assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. Panels should consult regularly with the parties to the dispute and give them adequate opportunity to develop a mutually satisfactory solution.”
This provision suggests that the function of panels is to make an objective assessment such as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements. However, how do panels fulfill their functions as provided in Art. 11 of the DSU? It is the issue that we will touch on in this chapter. In this chapter, the author explores on the standard of review issue under the WTO, i.e. “an objective assessment”; as well as on the exercised judicial economy principle developed in panel’s review.
With regard to the standard of review issue, the GATT/WTO dispute settlement procedures have increasingly confronted questions concerning the degree to which an international body, under the GATT/WTO, should “second guess” a decision of a national government agency concerning economic regulations that are allegedly inconsistent with an international rule. It seems clear that the international agreement doesn’t permit a national government’s determination always to prevail, otherwise the international rules could be easily evaded or rendered ineffective. But should the international body approach the issues involved without any deference to the national government? It has been argued in the GATT/WTO proceedings that panels should respect national government determinations, up to some point. That “point” is the crucial issue that has sometimes been labelled the “standard of review”.1
Of course, this issue is not unique to the GATT/WTO. Naturally, the standard-of-review issue is one that many legal systems face. “The standard-of-review question is faced at least implicitly whenever sovereign members of a treaty yield interpretive and dispute settlement powers to international panels and tribunals. Moreover, as national economies become increasingly interdependent, and as the need for international cooperation and coordination accordingly becomes greater, the standard-of-review question will become increasingly important.” 2 And “it can be seen that the standard-of-review question is a recurring and delicate one, and one that to some extent goes to the core of an international procedure that must (in a rule-based system) assess a national government’s actions against treaty or other international norms”. 3
However, for the immediate purpose, we want to focus below on the more particular question of the proper standard of review for a WTO panel when it undertakes to examine a national government’s actions or rulings that engage the question of consistency with the various WTO agreements and are subject to the DSU procedures.
II Application of Art. 11 as a General Standard of Review
Under the WTO jurisprudence, it’s demonstrated that Art. 11 of the DSU has been applied as a general standard of review. Art. 11 suggests that the function of panels is to make “an objective assessment” so as to assist the DSB in making the recommendations or in giving the rulings provided for in the covered agreements.
For example, in US-Shirts and Blouses (DS33), the Panel rules that, “although the DSU does not contain any specific reference to standards of review, we consider that Article 11 of the DSU which describes the parameters of the function of panels, is relevant here”. 4
And the application of Art. 11 as a general standard of review under the DSU is analyzed systematically in EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48) where the Appellate Body rules that: 5
“The first point that must be made in this connection, is that the SPS Agreement itself is silent on the matter of an appropriate standard of review for panels deciding upon SPS measures of a Member. Nor are there provisions in the DSU or any of the covered agreements (other than the Anti-Dumping Agreement) prescribing a particular standard of review. Only Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement has language on the standard of review to be employed by panels engaged in the ‘assessment of the facts of the matter’. We find no indication in the SPS Agreement of an intent on the part of the Members to adopt or incorporate into that Agreement the standard set out in Article 17.6(i) of the Anti-Dumping Agreement. Textually, Article 17.6(i) is specific to the Anti-Dumping Agreement.
[…]
We do not mean, however, to suggest that there is at present no standard of review applicable to the determination and assessment of the facts in proceedings under the SPS Agreement or under other covered agreements. In our view, Article 11 of the DSU bears directly on this matter and, in effect, articulates with great succinctness but with sufficient clarity the appropriate standard of review for panels in respect of both the ascertainment of facts and the legal characterization of such facts under the relevant agreements […]”
In sum, for all but one of the covered agreements, Art. 11 of the DSU sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels. As stated on more than one occasion, Art. 11 of the DSU, and, in particular, its requirement that “a panel should make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability of and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”, sets forth the appropriate standard of review for panels examining the consistency or inconsistency of alleged measures under the WTO jurisprudence. And the only exception is the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in which a specific provision, Art. 17.6, sets out a special standard of review for disputes arising under that Agreement（to be discussed in subsequent chapter）.6
III Review in “neither de novo nor total defence”
In EC-Hormones (DS26/DS48), in the view of the European Communities, “the principal alternative approaches to the problem of formulating the ‘proper standard of review’ so far as panels are concerned are two-fold. The first is designated as ‘de novo review’. This standard of review would allow a panel complete freedom to come to a different view than the competent authority of the Member whose act or determination is being reviewed. A panel would have to ‘verify whether the determination by the national authority was…correct (both factually and procedurally)’. The second is described as ‘deference’. Under a ‘deference’ standard, a panel, in the submission of the European Communities, should not seek to redo the investigation conducted by the national authority but instead examine whether the ‘procedure’ required by the relevant WTO rules had been followed”.7 In this respect, the Appellate Body rules that:8
“So far as fact-finding by panels is concerned, their activities are always constrained by the mandate of Article 11 of the DSU: the applicable standard is neither de novo review as such, nor ‘total deference’, but rather the ‘objective assessment of the facts’. Many panels have in the past refused to undertake de novo review, wisely, since under current practice and systems, they are in any case poorly suited to engage in such a review. On the other hand, ‘total deference to the findings of the national authorities’, it has been well said, ‘could not ensure an 'objective assessment' as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU’.”
The ruling is confirmed on many other occasions. For example, the Panel on US-Underwear (DS24) finds that: 9
“In our opinion, a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an ‘objective assessment’ as foreseen by Article 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue, and most notably in the panel report on the ‘Transformers’ case.
The panel in the ‘Transformers’ case was confronted with the argument of New Zealand that the determination of ‘material injury’ by the competent New Zealand investigating authority could not be scrutinized by the panel. The ‘Transformers’ panel responded to this argument as follows:
‘The Panel agreed that the responsibility to make a determination of material injury caused by dumped imports rested in the first place with the authorities of the importing contracting party concerned. However, the Panel could not share the view that such a determination could not be scrutinized if it were challenged by another contracting party. On the contrary, the Panel believed that if a contracting party affected by the determination could make a case that the importation could not in itself have the effect of causing material injury to the industry in question, that contracting party was entitled, under the relevant GATT provisions and in particular Article XXIII, that its representations be given sympathetic consideration and that eventually, if no satisfactory adjustment was effected, it might refer the matter to the CONTRACTING PARTIES, as had been done by Finland in the present case. To conclude otherwise would give governments complete freedom and unrestricted discretion in deciding anti-dumping cases without any possibility to review the action taken in the GATT. This would lead to an unacceptable situation under the aspect of law and order in international trade relations as governed by the GATT’.”
In short, for the panel to adopt a policy of total deference to the findings of the national authorities could not ensure an “objective assessment” as foreseen by Art. 11 of the DSU. This conclusion is supported, in our view, by previous panel reports that have dealt with this issue. However, panels do not see their review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities, either. For example, in Argentina-Footwear (DS121), the Panel doesn’t consider that they have the mandate to conduct a de novo review: 10
“This approach is consistent with the reports of panels reviewing national investigations… The panel on United States - Anti-dumping Duties on Import of Salmon from Norway concluded that it should not engage in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national investigating authority.
The panel on United States - Underwear followed this approach by noting, however, that it did not see its ‘review as a substitute for the proceedings conducted by national investigating authorities or by the Textiles Monitoring Body (TMB). Rather…the Panel's function should be to assess objectively the review conducted by the national investigating authority, in this case the CITA. We draw particular attention to the fact that a series of panel reports in the anti-dumping and subsidies/countervailing duties context have made it clear that it is not the role of panels to engage in a de novo review. In our view, the same is true for panels operating in the context of the ATC, since they would be called upon, as in the cases dealing with anti-dumping and/or subsidies/countervailing duties, to review the consistency of a determination by a national investigating authority imposing a restriction under the relevant provisions of the relevant WTO legal instruments, in this case the ATC. …’
Accordingly, the panel on United States - Underwear decided, ‘in accordance with Article 11 of the DSU, to make an objective assessment of the Statement issued by the US authorities … which, as the parties to the dispute agreed, constitutes the scope of the matter properly before the Panel without, however, engaging in a de novo review. … an objective assessment would entail an examination of whether the CITA had examined all relevant facts before it, whether adequate explanation had been provided of how the facts as a whole supported the determination made, and, consequently, whether the determination made was consistent with the international obligations of the United States’.
The panel on United States - Shirts and Blouses also stated that ‘[t]his is not to say that the Panel interprets the ATC as imposing on the importing Member any specific method either for collecting data or for considering and weighing all the relevant economic factors upon which the importing Member will decide whether there is need for a safeguard restraint. The relative importance of particular factors including those listed in Article 6.3 of the ATC is for each Member to assess in the light of the circumstances of each case’.
These past GATT and WTO panel reports make it clear that panels examining national investigations in the context of the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties, as well as safeguards under the ATC, have refrained from engaging in a de novo review of the evidence examined by the national authority.”
However, as emphasized by the Appellate Body, although panels are not entitled to conduct a de novo review of the evidence, nor to substitute their own conclusions for those of the competent authorities, this does not mean that panels must simply accept the conclusions of the competent authorities. In this respect, the phrase “de novo review” should not be used loosely. If a panel concludes that the competent authorities, in a particular case, have not provided a reasoned or adequate explanation for their determination, that panel has not, thereby, engaged in a de novo review. Nor has that panel substituted its own conclusions for those of the competent authorities. Rather, the panel has, consistent with its obligations under the DSU, simply reached a conclusion that the determination made by the competent authorities is inconsistent with the specific requirements of the covered Agreement. 11
